Regret: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis by Landman, Janet
Joumal f o r  the Theoty of Social Behauiour 1 7 : ~  July 1987 
0021-8308 $250 
Regret: A Theoretical and 
Conceptual Analysis 
JANET LANDMAN 
Regret is a common, possibly a universal, human experience, a truth 
eloquently asserted by James Baldwin (cited in Levinson, 1978, p. 250): 
Though we would like to live without regrets, and sometimes proudly insist that we 
have none, this is not really possible, if only because we are mortal. 
Related concepts such as depression, guilt, and shame have elicited a good 
deal of attention from scholars in philosophy, psychology, and other social 
sciences; but regret has for the most part escaped systematic inquiry, an 
assertion that is illustrated by the absence of the word regret as a keyword 
in psychological, psychoanalytic and sociological indexes. 
Beginning in the early 1980s, however, there has been a growing interest 
in regret within the tradition of formal decision theory. Classical theories 
of decision making have maintained that we make (or should make) 
decisions in order to maximize our expected utility (profit, pleasure, or 
other favourable outcome). Modern decision theorists have begun to 
recognize the importance of regret in decision making; regret theories 
assert that choice depends not only on the probability and the value of the 
chosen outcome but also on the amount of regret for alternatives not 
chosen (e.g., Bell, ,1981; Kahneman and Tversky, 1 9 8 2 ~ ,  1 9 8 2 ~ ;  Loomes 
and Sugden, 1982; Sage and White, 1983; Schoemer, 1962). 
In this article the concept of regret is defined and explicated on the 
basis of lexicographical, theoretical, and empirical considerations. A 
useful definition must be sufficiently broad as to include all the relevant 
phenomena and sufficiently narrow as to exclude other things. Accord- 
ingly, the dual purpose of this analysis is to identify the defining 
characteristics of regret and to distinguish regret from similar concepts 
(i.e., undoing, remorse, and guilt). In  addition, some implications of this 
analysis for the development of a psychology of regret will be explored. 
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WHAT IS REGRET 
Many thinkers-from the ancient Greek philsophers to modern cognitive 
scientists-have emphasized the role of reason in human thought and 
action. The stress on rationality has often been accompanied by tacit or 
explicit denigration of “nonrational” factors such as values, custom, and 
sentiment. In Book IV of The Republic, Plato presented the idea that the 
soul consists of three principles: ( I )  the rational element, which he called 
reason; (2) the passionate element, meaning the emotions, such as anger or 
love; and (3) the appetitive or concupiscent element, controlling one’s 
desires for food, fame, money, or other gain. Far from presenting these as 
three equally valuable elements, Plato argued that “reason ought to rule” 
(Book IV, p. 354). His choice of metaphors for these psychic elements 
reveals the same judgment: Plato calls reason the “shepherd” and the 
passionate and appetitive elements “the dogs” (pp. 353-354). 
Similarly, in the Aristotelian formulation, the soul is divided into two 
parts, rational and irrational, and the irrational part into two sub-parts, 
the vegetative (concerned with bodily nutrition) and the appetitive or 
concupiscent (concerned with non-bodily desires). Like Plato, Aristotle 
asserted that the irrational principle should be “amenable and obedient” 
(Aristotle, p. 179) to the rational principle. 
Centuries later, in the hands of Freud, these became, of course, ego and 
id. The Freudian metaphor of horse and rider, however, revealed a greater 
emphasis on the conflict between reason and unreason, while retaining the 
idea that reason (the ego) should strive to become the master of unreason 
(id). 
Finally, modern cognitive psychology can be described as emphasizing 
“psychologic” over “psychodynamics” (Abelson, I 968), if only in the 
interest of parsimony of explanation of human thought and action. 
Accordingly, cognitive psychologists discourage the over-use of vivid, 
concrete, imaginable, immediate, emotional, and anecdotal information 
and encourage the use of pallid but rational statistical or base-rate 
information in problem-solving and inference (Nisbett and Ross, 1980). 
Notwithstanding the potency of these arguments, and certainly not to 
make the converse assertion that reason ought to be ruled by sentiment, it 
is my contention that reason and emotion not only typically play 
interdependent roles in thought and action, but furthermore that the 
proper relation of reason and emotion is one of interdependence. The 
mutual roles of reason and sentiment in human thought and action are 
particularly evident in the phenomenon of regret, an assertion to which I 
will now turn. 
According to Webster’s Unabridged Third New International Diction- 
ary,‘ the word regret is of Scandinavian origin, being akin to the Old Norse 
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word grata, to weep. Examination of the lexicon reveals three slightly 
different meanings of regret, as follows. ( I )  The first definition highlights 
the loss of desirable entities: “to remember with sorrow or griec mourn 
the loss or death o f ;  miss poignantly.” (2) The second definition of regret 
emphasizes unfavorable, rather than desirable, matters as the targets of 
regret: ?o have dissatisfaction, misgivings, or distress of mind conern- 
ing; to be keenly sorry for one’s mistakes.” (3) The definition for the 
noun form discusses conditions under which regret occurs and the kinds of 
emotions related to regret: “sorrow caused by circumstances beyond one’s 
control or power to repair: grief or pain tinged with disappointment, 
dissatisfaction, longing, remorse, or comparable emotion.” As these 
definitions suggest, regret is a broad concept incorporating cognitive and 
affective aspects-the focus of the first portion of this paper. 
Regret as a Cognitive Phenomenon 
Regret is described in the lexicon in both emotional terms (as sorrow, 
grief, or pain) and in non-emotional terms (as remembering and as having 
misgivings, for example). The purely cognitive or judicial sense of regret 
might be expressed when one describes one’s vague misgivings over 
having bought a particular car instead of another or over choosing to see 
one movie rather than another. These aspects of regret do not necessarily 
entail “warm” emotional pangs but merely “c001” cognitive processes of 
memory, judgment or evaluation. Hence, theoretical and empirical ana- 
lyses of regret will have to take into account not only the sorrowful 
emotional aspects, but also the cognitive aspects. 
The assumption that regret has a significant cognitive component also 
appears in theoretical formulations across a number of disciplines- 
including: ( I )  certain philosophical and psychological analyses of the 
nature of emotion and cognition in general and of regret in particular; (2) 
philosophical and psychological analyses of counterfactural reason; and 
(3) philosophical, economic, and psychological perspectives on decision 
making. 
First, if regret is an emotion (a proposition suggested by the previous 
examination of the lexicon), it is an emotion that is largely cognitive. 
Indeed, certain scholars conclude that cognition is a primary component 
of all emotional experience. Bedford (1956-1957), for example, argues that 
emotions reflect not only (or even primarily) feelings but also assessment, 
and that the principal purpose of emotion statements is ‘‘judicial” (p. 298). 
(This argument implies that all emotional experience-including 
regret-which occurs after the development of some minimal level of 
cognitive functioning possesses a cognitive component, whose magnitude 
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may vary depending on the particular emotion being experienced, as well 
as on other factors.) 
Turning more specifically to regret, consider the following statment: “I 
never feel the slightest pang of regret for what I did” (Bedford, 1956-1957, 
p. 299). According to a thoroughly cognitive analysis, this proposition is 
not a simple “descriptive statement about what people feel and do” 
(Bedford, p. 300). Instead, the statement reflects “the justification of a 
choice” (Bedford, p. 299) and is equivalent to saying “‘My choice was 
quite correct (sound, justified)”’ (p. 300). In other words, regret is in this 
view primarily a matter of critical judgment and only secondarily or not at 
all a matter of feelings. Although I do not concur with efforts to reduce 
emotions in general to matters of cool cognition alone, I believe that regret 
does entail a significant degree of cognitive appraisal. Relative to other 
emotions such as anger or fear, regret seems to have a higher degree of 
cognitive elaboration. In addition, relative to related emotions such as 
remorse and guilt, regret seems to be more a matter of “cool” cognitive 
assessment than of “warm” emotional reactivity. 
In a similar vein, one of the chief tents of a recently developed theory of 
emotion (Roseman, 1979, 1982) is that emotions are aroused and dis- 
tinguished by particular combinations of cognitive dimensions (motiv- 
ational state, situational state, probability of outcome, agency, and 
legitimacy of outcome). In a series of vignette experiments, Roseman 
(1982) varied these five dimensions in different stories and asked subjects 
to rate the intensity of certain emotions-including regret-experienced 
by the protagonists in each story. As predicted by the theory, the 
attribution of emotions was significantly affected by these cognitive 
dimensions, providing indirect empirical evidence for the existence of a 
substantial cognitive component in a nrmber of emotions, including 
regret. 
Another line of philosophical and psychological analysis suggests that 
regret is a variety of reason-a subset of the larger phenomenon of 
induction. The process of beginning with the actual (“facts”) and 
imagining the possible (“counterfactuals”) is a type of induction in that it 
proceeds “from a given set of cases to a wider set” (Goodman, 1973, p. 58). 
In philosophy the related notion of “possible worlds” has recently 
received a good deal of attention as a variety of normal mental or 
imaginative construction (Goodman, 1973; Kripke, 1980; D. K. Lewis, 
1973). Possible worlds, or counterfactual situations, are ways the world 
might be or might have been. For example, when two dice are thrown, only 
one out of a possible 36 possible worlds is actualized-e.g., a 5 and 6 
(Kripke, 1980). The human ability to imagine or construct the remaining 
35 possible states of being-r possible worlds- is an important form of 
thought currently being addressed by philosophers and others (Kah- 
Regret: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis 1 39 
neman and Tversky, 1 9 8 2 ~  1982~;  Kahneman and Miller, 1986; Markus and 
Nurius, 1986). One implication of this perspective is that regret may be 
viewed as a normal, inevitable, and direct consequence of rationality, i.e., “a 
direct consequence of the capacity to recognize and to name differen- 
ces . . . and the capacity to conceive multiple alternatives” (Hampshire, 
1983,’~. 145). In the face of less-than-satisfying forms of reality, regret is 
likely to occur, whereby one acknowledges that the world is less satisfac- 
tory than it might be, and imagines how it might have been better. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1982~)  have directly linked the idea of possible 
worlds to the study of regret, advancing the notion of a “stimulation 
heuristic” by which people are thought to construct mental models in an 
effort to deal with actual life outcomes, to imagine alternative past events, 
to predict future events, or to assess causation. Regret, according to 
Kahneman and Tversky (1982b, p. 206) is a “counterfactual emotion’’ 
which often serves as the impetus for the mental undoing of past events. 
As part of a larger program of research on decision making, these 
investigators have explored the following questions (among others) 
concerning regret and the cognitive construction of alternative possible 
worlds: ( I )  Given the same unfortunate outcome, do people experience 
more regret for having attained the outcome via action rather than 
inaction? (2) Given the same unfortunate outcome, do people experience 
more regret for “near misses” than for “misses by a mile”? Experimental 
vignette studies have produced affirmative answers to each of these 
research questions (Johnson, ,1986; Kahnemann and Tversky, 1982a, 
1982b; Landman, in press). 
Another thoroughly cognitive approach to regret are those economic 
decision-making models that have recently added regret to the traditional 
utility functions lng used to predict decisions (e.g., Bell, 1981; Loomes and 
Sugden, 1982; Sage and White, 1983; Schoeffler, 1962). Typically regret is 
defined in these models in the coolest of cognitive terms-e.g., as the 
difference between a payoff or outcome actually received and the maximum 
possible payoff or best possible outcome (Schoemer, 1962). According to 
regret theories, the expected utility of choice X (the alternative chosen) is a 
mathematical function of the probabilty of X times the value of X minus the 
amount of regret for not-X (the better alternative not chosen). 
The theory of cognitive dissonance provides a final example of a theoreti- 
cal formulation which locates regret as a cognitive component of the process 
of decision making. From withiin the cognitive dissonance paradigm (Festi- 
nger, 1957, 1964; Festinger and Walster, 1964), it was noted that 
most but not all subjects altered their attitudes to correspond to counter- 
attitudinal behavior elicited in an initial phase of an experiment; in fact, 
some subjects evidenced regret for their dissonance-arousing behavior and 
actually chose to undo it. Within the dissonance paradigm, subjects 
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manifested regret through decision reversal, reversing an earlier choice 
(phonograph record, hair style, job placement), and selecting an alterna- 
tive they had earlier rejected. Festinger and Walster (1964) report that, 
given the opportunity to reconsider a decision, as many as 62 per cent of 
subjects exhibit evidence of post-decision regret by reversing their initial 
decision. Of course, regret is something of a bite noir for the theory of 
cognitive dissonance, since it represents the opposite of dissonance 
reduction through cognitive manipulations. Regret represents a failure to 
rationalize or justify one’s prior behavior. 
In Eestinger’s original formulation regret was defined as a defensive 
operation occurring subsequent to an action or a decision and designed to 
avoid dissonance “by psychologically revoking the decision” (Festinger, 
1957, p. 270) .  In 1964 Festinger revised his earlier thinking about regret, 
de-emphasizing the defensive and stressing the purely cognitive aspects. 
Festinger’s later view was that regret simply results from an increase in 
the salience of dissonant thoughts immediately after acting or making a 
decision. For example, according to Festinger, upon choosing one of two 
alternatives, one’s attention may be temporarily focused on the undesir- 
able aspects of the chosen alternative and the desirable aspects of the 
rejected alternative. Hence, regret. As will be seen later, this purely 
cognitive account of dissonance, and thus of regret, has not received 
empirical support. 
The decision-making literature suggests that insofar as choice is 
inescapable and insofar as conflict between incommensurable choices, 
claims, or ways of life is inevitable (Hampshire, 1983), regret may also be 
an inevitable, natural or “normal” part of living. Because it is not possible 
to “have it all,” and because we know it, regret is a rational human 
experience. 
Examination of the above philosophical, economic, and psychological 
perspectives suggests the following conclusions: ( I ) Regret, as perhaps all 
emotional activity of intact adults, has a significant cognitive component. 
( 2 )  Regret is associated with higher-order cognitive processes such as 
critical judgment, induction, and decision making. (3) Regret is not 
reducible to cognition. Hence, it is necessary but not sufficient to define 
regret as a cognitive phenomenon. 
Regret as an Emotional Phenomenon 
The etymological information linking regret with weeping suggests that 
regret is emotional in nature. That regret is an emotion is also evident in the 
definitional allusions to distress of mind and to being keenly sorry for 
one’s mistakes, as well as in the mention of sorrow, grief, pain, disappoint- 
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ment, dissatisfaction, longing, remorse, and “comparable emotion.” The 
emotional sense of regret is highlighted in statements describing: grief 
over the loss of a loved one, as when Shelley referred to “that fair lady 
whom thou dost regret”; distress over a fatal accident, the outcome of an 
election, or over losing the lottery by a single digit; keen dissatisfaction 
with one’s job; remorseful sorrow over harsh words uttered in a heated 
argument or over one’s failure to remember a loved one’s birthday. As 
these definitions and illustrations indicate, longing, sorrow, and remorse 
are all effective cousins of regret. 
Having examined how regret is necessarily cognitive, let us now explore 
its emotional component, beginning first with certain generally applicable 
distinctions between emotion and thought, and proceeding to consideration 
of theories of emotion and of the self. First, emotion cannot be reduced to 
cognition, since emotion is not simply “ a reasoned calculation” (Sartre, 
1948, p. 51). That cognition and emotion are distinct psychological 
activities has been asserted by a number of theorists of emotion-for 
example, Leventhal (1980, p. 192), who argues that “no matter how much 
we enrich, analyze, or connect affects to cognition, the psychology of 
emotion depends on a fundamental truth:. . . emotions are not attrib- 
utions. ” 
It might be argued that emotion is not the same as cognition primarily 
because arousal is a necessary component of emotion but not of cognition. 
Schachter and Singer’s (1962) two-factor theory of emotion, for example, 
incorporates both cognition and arousal as necessary elements of emotion. 
Similarly, Fiske ( I 982) distinguishes between affect (emotion) and evalu- 
ation, defining evaluations as “valenced judgments” devoid of the arousal 
that is sometimes considered an essential feature of emotion (e.g., 
Schachter and Singer, I 962; Schachter, 1964). This supposition is relevant 
to the concept of regret, which seems in one sense to be more like a simple 
evaluative cognition (i.e., a valenced judgment) and in other senses more 
like an emotion. 
Recent research sheds light on the question as to whether arousal is a 
typical element of the experience of regret. Russell and Mehrabian (1977) 
had people rate a large number of emotion terms-including regretful and 
gui l tp -on  the dimensions of pleasure, dominance, and arousal, dimen- 
sions commonly thought to be necessary components of emotion. Whereas 
guilg was rated as involving a significant degree of arousal, regretful was 
not. If ratings are taken as accurate measures of arousal and if arousal is 
taken as a necessary component of emotion (both arguable assumptions), 
then regret would be more properly described as an evaluation (a 
cognition) than as an emotion. But, even if regret lacks a significant degree 
of arousal, there are at  least three reasons to retain the working assump- 
tion that regret has a significant emotional component. 
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First, the aforementioned dictionary definitions speak of regret as 
involving at minimum dissatisfaction, disappointment, or distress, and at 
most sorrow, grief or mourning-all emotions. Hence by definition regret 
is an emotion. Similarly, the fact that investigators of emotion (Russell and 
Mehrabian, 1977; Roseman, 1979) have included regret in their analyses 
suggests that this assumption has a priori theoretical support. More 
directly, regret has been described as a “counterfactual emotion” (Kah- 
neman and Tversky, 1982b) and as a “special form of frustration in which 
the event one would change is an action one has either taken or failed to 
take” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982a, p. I 70. These characterizations 
lend further a prion’ theoretical support to the assumption that regret is an 
affective matter. 
Second, it can be argued that arousal is not a necessary component of 
emotion (Leventhal, 1980, p. 153).’ From this perspective, with which I am 
in agreement, even if regret lacks an arousal dimension, it must neverthe- 
less be included in the emotion category since it possesses a reliable 
pleasure/unpleasure dimension. 
Finally, perhaps it is partly due to the fact that regret is often a 
self-relevant type of evaluation that regret “feels” more like an emotion and 
less like a simple cognitive judgment. Unlike other cognitive activities 
(e.g., discrimination learning, concept formation, or memory for nonsense 
syllables), regret is an experience which frequently entails self-reflection 
and self-appraisal, and hence is an eminently personal experience.3 
According to James (1890, p. 323), one’s sense of selfhood is based 
primarily on the “warm” type of self-concept (any self-representation that 
includes self-fcelings) rather than on “cold intellectual self-estimation.” 
Similarly, as defined by proponents of the object-relations school within 
clinical psychology and psychiatry, the self is an “intrapsychic structure 
consisting of multiple self-representations and their related affect disposi- 
tions” (Kernberg, I 975, p. 3 15, emphasis added). Furthermore, self-regard 
may “always reflect a combination of affective and cognitive components” 
The notion of possible selves, which is analogous to the earlier discussed 
idea of possible worlds, adds to an understanding of regret. According to 
Markus ( I 982; Markus and Nurius, I 986), possible selves are cognitive/ 
affective representations of the self in some currently unactualized state. 
Thus, an individual’s self-concept includes not only representations about 
one’s current actuality, but also representations of past selves (e.g., “I was 
a shy child”) and ideas of what one could become in the future (e.g., “I 
hope to become a comfortable lecturer”). Insofar as possible selves are 
representations of longed-for (positive) or rejected (negative) aspects of 
the self, the process of reflecting on possible selves would seem to be an 
experience with the potential to arouse emotions such as regret. If 
(Kernberg, 1975, p. 317). 
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theorists such as James, Kernberg, and Markus are right that one’s 
self-concept necessarily involves feelings, then this implies that regret 
concerning oneself is unlikely to amount merely to a cool “valenced 
judgment.” 
This examination of the nature of emotion in general and of regret in 
particular leads to the following conclusions: ( I )  Though reason and 
sentiment are more often than not intertwined, emotion cannot be 
reduced to cognition. (2) Despite its relatively high degree of cognitive 
involvement and low degree of arousal, regret is nevertheless an emotion 
due to its reliable pleasure/unpleasure component. (3) One reason for the 
undeniably emotional nature of regret is its frequent association with 
self-relevant reflection. In sum, these lines of thought support the 
conclusion that it is necessary but not sufficient to define regret as an 
affective phenomenon. 
Regret As  a Cognitive/Emotional Phenomenon 
For Descartes, who thought a great deal about thought, human beings are 
defined as such not only by virtue of their extraordinary intellectual 
faculties, i.e., the “cogito,” but also by virtue of their capacity for emotion: 
What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], 
affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels (1952, p. 79, brackets 
are translator’s). 
The present analysis rests on the related assumption that regret is 
conceptually, logically and experientially a co-constitutive product of an 
emotion-cognition-action whole. This is not to say either that emotion is 
just another cognition or that emotion is entirely other than cognition, but 
to assert that thought and feeling are closely interdependent activities. 
Theory and research on cognitive dissonance also supports the idea that 
regret is a matter of reason and emotion working in concert with one 
another. According to Festinger ( I  957), immediately following a choice 
between alternatives, we experience conflict, due to our acute 
consciousness of. the unattractive aspects of the chosen alternative and the 
appealing aspects of the rejected alternative. Since conflict is an unpleas- 
ant state, we are motivated to change the state of conflict, which we 
regularly do by engaging in cognitive maneuvers to justify the decision- 
for example, changing our original attitudes. 
As previously noted, in 1964 Festinger sought to downplay this psy- 
chodynamic explanation of regret and to explain regret in purely cognitive 
terms, as an effect of an increase in salience of the desirable features of a 
rejected alternative or the undesirable features of the alternative chosen 
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immediately following a decision. But this purely cognitive account of 
regret has not been supported by data. For example, subjects who were 
compelled to attend to dissonant elements of their decisions evidenced not 
more regret, as the cognitive account (Festinger, 1964) had predicted, but 
more defensive justification (Brehm and Wicklund, 1970). Indeed, in a 
review of the cognitive dissonance literature, Wicklund and Brehm ( 1976, 
p. 107) reject a purely cognitive understanding of dissonance phenomena 
in favor of the original motivational explanation precisely because of the 
existence of regret: “If dissonance reduction were simply a matter of 
noting relevant cognitions and proceeding to a reasoned conclusion, there 
would never be any reason to suspect the appearance of regret.” The 
cognitive dissonance formulation then supports the idea that regret is not 
merely a cool, cognitive matter, but a matter of both reason and emotion. 
It remains to consider the idea that not only is regret a matter of both 
reason and emotion, but that it should be. In a symposium entitled “The 
Darker Side of Rationality,” Dawes (1981, p. I )  described a thoroughly 
“rational man,” Rudolph Hoess, who, as commandant of Auschwitz for 
three years, supervised the murder of 2,900,000 persons. Though he was 
awaiting execution for his crimes, Hoess felt no remorse over having seen 
to it that nearly 3 million individuals were murdered under his command, 
because he judged the program of extermination to be both rational and 
just. Instead, what he regretted in himself and his underlings was the 
experience or display of emotion (either beneficent or malevolent) as they 
carried out the “Final Solution”. Hoess excoriates not only those Nazis 
who sadistically enjoyed brutalizing the “prisoners,” but also those who 
were unable to control their “good nature and kind heart” (cited in Dawes, 
1981, p. 2) .  Describing his own difficulty in properly “stifl[ing] all softer 
emotions,” Hoess wrote: 
On one occasion two small children were so absorbed in some game that they quite 
refused to let their mother tear them away from it. Even the Jews in the “special 
attachment” were reluctant to pick the children up. The imploring look in the eyes 
of the mother, who certainly knew what was happening, is something I shall never 
forget. The people already in the gas chamber were becoming restive and I had to 
act. Everyone was looking at me; I nodded to the junior non-commissioned officer 
on duty and he picked up the screaming, struggling children in his arms and 
carried them into the gas chamber accompanied by their mother, who was weeping 
in the most heart-rending fashion. My pain was so great that I longed to vanish 
from the scene; yet I might not show the slightest trace of emotion (cited in Dawes, 
1981, pp. I & 2). 
As Dawes points out, this chilling self-description of a rational man 
casts doubt on the assumption that if only reason controls emotion, worthy 
decisions and acts will follow. One wishes that Hoess, hyper-rational and 
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thereby monstrous, had anticipated his regret for the look in the eyes of 
the mother and had allowed this emotion to supersede what he saw as the 
dictates of reason. This example and the previous analysis illustrate the 
truth that, far from being of necessity a nefarious force, emotion can be a 
humanizing force. The exercise of uninhibited emotion quite obviously 
makes for faulty decisions and actions. But the exercise of unrelieved 
rationality makes for equally faulty decisions and acts. Ideally reason and 
sentiment are equally honorable compeers in the attempt to live well. 
HOW DOES REGRET DIFFER FROM SIMILAR CONCEPTS 
Examination of the lexicon indicated that regret is a member of a family of 
similar concepts, among which are undoing, remorse, and guilt. In the 
following discussion I shall attempt to clarify further the concept of regret 
by specifying how it contrasts with these concepts. 
Regret versus Undoing 
As previously noted, regret and undoing are closely related concepts, in 
that regret (defined, for example, as being sorry for losses, mistakes, or 
other events) is often associated with efforts to imaginatively cancel or 
nullify those losses and errors. In Webster’s Third Unabridged Inter- 
national Dictionary, undoing is defined in this way: “to make of no effect or 
as if not done; to make null; to bring to naught; to cancel.” Thus undoing 
is a mode of response to the experience of regret whereby one engages in 
mental or behavioral acts intended to cancel a regretted mistake. A classic 
example of undoing is Lady Macbeth’s handwashing following the murder 
of Duncan. 
In the psychoanalytic perspective, undoing is a defense mechanism 
“whereby the subject makes an attempt to cause past thoughts, words, 
gestures or actions not to have occurred” (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973, 
p. 477). According to Freud, undoing represents and embodies a state of 
ambivalence or conflict between two opposing impulses of equivalent 
strength, “invariably” love and hate (Freud, 1909, p. 50). By the same 
token, Freudian undoing often but not always entails an individual’s doing 
or thinking the polar opposite of an earlier act or thought. 
Because Freud observed the operation of undoing in patients with 
obsessive neuroses more often than in patients with hysterical or other 
types of disorders, he came to characterize undoing as a typical defense of 
obsessives (see also A. Freud, 1936). In “Notes Upon a Case of Obses- 
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sional Neurosis” ( I gog), Freud reported vivid examples of undoing in his 
patient who has come to be known as the “Rat Man.” In one instance, on 
the day in which his friend was to leave for holiday the Rat Man felt 
compelled to move a stone to the side of the road lest his friend’s carriage 
be overturned by it later. After a few minutes, deciding that his behavior 
was absurd, he felt compelled to return and replace the stone to its 
original spot in the road. 
The Freudian concept of undoing encompasses not only overt deeds but 
also a variety of internal acts, such as “wishes, temptations, impulses, 
reflections, doubts, commands, or prohibitions” (Freud, 1909, p. 78). 
Following Freud, Fenichel too delineates a broad conception of undoing: 
“something positive is done which, actually or magically, is the opposite of 
something which, again actually or in imagination, was done before” 
(1945, p. 153). Even in Festinger’s formulation of regret (1g57), the 
revoking of a decision was thought to be accomplished either behaviorally 
or mentally, a view that is congruent with the broad conception of 
undoing. Thus, undoing may take one of two forms-overt (behavioral) or 
psychic (mental). 
Lady Macbeth’s handyashing is an example of something’s being done 
to attempt to magically expunge something which was actually done. The 
Rat Man’s behavior is more complex. In one sense it illustrates the case in 
which someone does something in actuality to cancel something which was 
actually done: i.e., moving and re-moving the stolen. But in another sense, 
both the initial act of moving the stone out of the road and the subsequent 
act of undoing represent “magical” acts; both are significant only in their 
status as physical instantiations of symbolic personal meaning. 
If undoing can take actual and mental forms, the question arises as to 
which is more likely. Festinger (1957) believed that deeds are more 
difficult to undo because it would be embarrassing to do so. Publicly 
performed acts are indeed not easily undone. As Lady Macbeth dis- 
covered, it was not the case that “a little water clears us of this deed”; acts 
can prove impossible to undo. However, is it the case that physical acts are 
of necessity more recalcitrant to undoing than mental acts? If someone is 
thinking of eating a candy bar, it may be extremely difficult to undo this 
thought. Thus it cannot be said that physical acts are necessarily more 
intransigent to undoing than mental acts.4 
Mental undoing has been investigated recently in research on the 
simulation heuristic, which involves imagining possible past events, 
predicting future events, and assessing causation and probabilities. In a 
set of experiments on the simulation heuristic, Kahneman and Tversky 
(rg82b) presented subjects with brief written scenarios about a hypo- 
thetical Mr. Jones who is killed in an automobile accident on his way home 
from work. The usualness of one of two elements of each scenario was 
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varied, so that subjects were either told that Mr. Jones had taken an 
unusual route home or had left the office at an  unusual time. After reading 
a version of this scenario, subjects were asked to complete an “if only ...” 
stem from the perspective of Mr. Jones’s friends or family. The experimen- 
tal instructions which operationalized undoing are as follows: “AS 
commonly happens in such situations, the Jones family and their friends 
often thought and often said, ‘If only ...’ during the days that followed the 
accident. How did they continue this thought? Please write one or more 
likely completions.” 
I t  turns out that most people undo the story by imagining a more usual 
scenario-i.e., by removing the unusual element of time or route (Kah- 
neman and Tversky, 1982b; Landman, 1984). Kahneman and Tversky 
( I  982b) and Kahneman and Miller ( I  986) explain this finding in terms of 
ease of simulation-i.e., given an unfortunate event or outcome, people 
are more inclined to mentally undo it by constructing more readily 
imaginable (more usual) antecedent events rather than less readily 
imaginable (unusual) ones. 
This idea is based on what may be one of the “most natural divisions the 
mind is subject to” (Ozick, 1983, p. ioo)-that between the usual and the 
unusual. Cynthia Ozick elaborates on the meaning of this distinction in an 
essay called “The Riddle of the Ordinary.” According to Ozick, we 
respond to the unusual by: 
paying attention to it. . . it seizes us so undividedly, it declares itself so dazzlingly 
or killingly, it is so deafening with its LOOK! SEE! NOTICE! PAY ATTENTION! 
that the only answer we can give is to look, see, notice, and pay attention. . . The 
Extraordinary does not let you shrug your shoulders and walk away (Ozick, 1983, 
p. 201). 
In contrast, the usual is taken-for-granted, safe, almost invisible: 
The Ordinary lets us live out our humanity, it doesn’t scare us, i t  doesn’t excite us, 
it doesn’t distract us-it brings us the safe return of the school bus every day.. . 
(Ozick, 1983, p. 201).  
Whatever the mechanism (the ease of simulation of usual events, the 
attention-getting nature of unusual events), research on the simulation 
heuristic suggests that a regrettable life event or outcome unleashes the 
cognitive process of mental undoing, particularly undoing of unusual 
antecedent events. 
Freud (191 I ,  1925) pointed out that thought can also be viewed as a kind 
of hypothetical action: “judging is the intellectual action which decides 
the choice of motor action. . . Thought is to be regarded as an experimen- 
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tal action” (1925, p. 216). More to the point, as Hartman (1959) argued, 
imaginative thought-f which undoing can be said to be an example-may 
function as a “detour to adaptive action” (cited in Schafer, 1968, p. 89). 
Thus, undoing may be construed as a mental activity carried on in the 
service of planning for future behavior-thinking backwards in time in 
order to plan for the future. 
In his action theory of emotion, Schafer erects a bridge between thought 
and emotions which has application to the present discussion of regret and 
undoing. Schafer identifies three kinds of operations used to modify or to 
control emotions (particularly unpleasant emotions like regret): ( I )  
refraining from acting emotionally, (2) acting to change the environment 
or the situation, and (3) “engaging in cognitive actions by which one 
transforms one’s situation” (1976, p. 295). According to Schafer, although 
all three operations have the potential to change emotion, the second and 
third are the most effective in bringing about emotional change. Interest- 
ingly, these latter operations correspond precisely to the two types of 
undoing presently being considered-behavioral and mental. This formu- 
lation offers insight into one of the probable functions of undoing-i.e., to 
modulate the emotion of regret through the application of behavioral or 
mental treatments. More generally, mental undoing may serve the func- 
tion of directing both the emotion of regret and future action pertinent to 
the regrettable situation. 
The principal conclusion to be drawn at this point is this: imaginative 
thought is directly linked to both emotion and action by way of its ability 
to construct alternative visions of reality. If thought is at least a way of 
governing emotion and at most an experimental form of behavior, then the 
operation of mental undoing is a significant human activity in its own 
right, as well as a significant concomitant of regret. 
Remorse versus Regret 
It might be recalled that one of the definitions of regret explicitly drew a 
connection with remorse: “grief or pain tinged with . . . remorse or 
comparable emotions.” Remorse itself is defined as “a gnawing distress 
arising from a sense of guilt for past wrongs (as injuries done to others).” 
Synonyms are self-reproach and penitence. Hence remorse is by definition 
closely related to regret-both are painful or distressing emotions having 
to do with an unfortunate life event or transgression. 
The distressing quality of remorse has been expressed by Adam Smith, 
who referred to remorse as “of all the sentiments which can enter the 
human breast the most dreadful” (1759, p. 139). But empirical evidence 
suggests that remorse may be a less bitter experience than regret. Russell 
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and Mehrabian (1977) asked subjects to rate the unpleasantness of a large 
number of emotion words, among which were repentant (a synonym of 
penitence and thus of remorse) and regretful. The results indicated that 
repentance did not differ significantly from zero on the dimension of 
unpleasantness, while regret was rated as significantly unpleasant. If it is 
true that remorse is generally viewed as a not terribly unpleasant emotion 
relative to regret, this may be due to the association of remorse with 
religion and with the forgiveness that is presumably forthcoming as a 
result of remorse in a religious ~ o n t e x t . ~  
In addition to differing on the dimension of unpleasantness, regret and 
remorse also differ regarding one’s degree of responsibility for or degree of 
control over the matter. It will be recalled that the lexicographical 
definition of regret included matters that are beyond one’s control. Four 
centuries ago, Montaigne ( 1580/1936) too asserted that “repentance does 
not properly affect things that are not in our power; regret, indeed, does” 
(p. 23). In an analysis with which I concur, Thalberg (1963) argues that 
personal responsibility is a defining feature of remorse but not necessarily 
of regret, asserting that it is possible to regret events over which one has 
no control (e.g., a Supreme Court decision), but that one feels remorse 
only over one’s own voluntary acts. In a similar vein, Solomon (1983, p. 
349) defines remorse as the response to a state of affairs for which oneself 
is to blame, whereas regret is the response to “circumstances beyond my 
control.” Indeed, for this very reason, according to Solomon, regret is an 
effective way to avoid remorse and guilt. 
Thalberg (1963) identifies four other ways in which remorse and regret 
differ. Most broadly, one can regret the acts of another person but one 
feels remorse only with respect to one’s own acts. Secondly, one can regret 
doing something morally innocuous or even virtuous, but one feels 
remorse only for acts that one considers morally wrong. An example of a 
morally innocuous act that may produce regret but not remorse is the 
commonplace one in which one is unable to attend a social event to which 
one was invited; in this circumstance it is ordinarily appropriate to express 
regret rather than remorse. I t  is even possible for a morally upright act to 
produce regret, but not remorse--e.g., having to inform a mother of her 
son’s death (Thalberg, 1963, p. 547). Third, remorse and regret differ in 
that one can regret one’s future actions (having to notify the mother of the 
death of her son) but feels remorse only over past acts. 
A final distinction between remorse and regret has to do with the 
presence of an intention not to commit the same offense in the future-a 
defining feature of genuine remorse but not of regret. As Montaigne 
observed, one might regret that one is so constituted that one “can do no 
better” (1580/1936, p. 23) in the future. In addition, one may regret that it 
will be necessary to do something in the future that one might prefer not to 
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do (e.g., inform a mother of her son’s death); but remorse necessitates a 
firm resolve not to commit the same act again. 
Still other distinctions can be drawn between remorse and regret, one of 
which follows from certain features shared by remorse and guilt. 
According to Fenichel, guilt is the feeling that ‘I have done wrong’-a 
painful judgment about some past occurrence which has the character of 
remorse” (1945, p. 134, emphasis added). Such cross-referencing supports 
the intuition that remorse and guilt are partially overlapping concepts. 
Nevertheless, remorse and guilt are not identical concepts. According to 
Freud, the term remorse should be reserved for the distressed reaction 
following an overt act (often an act of aggression), while guilt can arise not 
only in response to overt conduct but also “from the perception of an evil 
impulse” (1930, p. 84). The Freudian construal of remorse conforms quite 
closely to the lexicographical use of the term, in that it highlights the 
manner in which remorse is an emotional response to an actual offense. 
Thalberg (1963, p. 546) is in agreement with Freud’s distinction between 
remorse and guilt, and presents a vivid example of the difference: “We can 
feel guilty about intending to take a double portion of strawberries, but 
nobody ever feels remorse for his unexecuted designs’’ (emphasis in 
original). Just as guilt follows not only from overt deeds but from covert 
ones, it makes sense to say that one may regret not only overt acts but also 
one’s inner acts, i.e., thoughts, attitudes, wishes, or impulses. For. exam- 
ple, an individual may come to regret his social prejudices even when he 
did not act on them; however, in this case, there will be no remorse 
because there was no overt act. (Of course, just as one is legally and 
morally more culpable for acts than for unexecuted intentions, it follows 
that the intensity of one’s regret for overt acts is likely to exceed that of 
one’s regret for unexecuted acts.) 
To  summarize the differences between regret and remorse: it is sensible 
to speak of remorse with respect to one’s own past, voluntary, overt and 
morally wrong acts (or failures to act); it is sensible to speak of regret with 
respect to all of these circumstances but also with respect to others-e.g., 
(a) one’s own unexecuted intentions, thoughts, wishes, impulses; (b) one’s 
own future, involuntary, and morally innocuous or virtuous acts; and (c) 
the acts of others which share the foregoing characteristics. In general, 
remorse entails a measure of personal responsibility which is not a 
necessary feature of regret. Most broadly, of regret and remorse, “regret is 
by far the broader notion” (Thalberg, 1963, p. 547). 
Guilt versus Regret 
Definitions of guilt include the following: delinquency or failure in respect 
to one’s duty: offense; responsibility for an offense: fault; state of 
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deserving punishment: deserts; the fact of having committed a breach of 
conduct; and the state of consciousness of one who has committed an  
offense. From these definitions we can conclude that guilt describes both 
states of being and states of mind, and both moral and legal matters. 
In the foregoing discussion of remorse, the essential similarity and an 
important distinction between guilt and remorse as defined by Freud was 
delineated. Both remorse and guilt are painful responses to an awareness 
of one’s own transgressions; but guilt has to do both with overt acts and 
with purely mental acts while remorse is limited to acts which were overtly 
effected . 
With respect to their distressing nature, regret and guilt are more 
similar than not. Common definitions of regret evoke its painful quality, 
describing regret as a matter of being keenly sorry for or distressed about 
losses, transgressions or mistakes. Similarly, guilt is a “painful judgment” 
(Fenichel, 1945, p. 134). Moreover, there is empirical support for the 
assumption that guilt and regret are equally painful experiences. When 
Russell and Mehrabian (1977) had subjects rate a large number of emotion 
terms, among which were regretful and guilty, on the dimension of pleasure, 
regret and guilt were judged to be significantly and equally unpleasurable. 
Over what sorts of matters does one experience regret versus guilt? With 
respect to their shared objects, first of all, as discussed in the foregoing 
section, it seems possible to regret both overt deeds and unexecuted or 
entirely psychic acts; therefore regret is congruent with the broad concep- 
tualization of guilt as entailing both overt and purely mental deeds. 
Second, it makes sense to speak of regret and guilt with reference both to 
acts and to failures to act. For example, one may regret (and feel guilty for) 
having robbed a bank. However, someone else may regret (but not feel 
guilty for) having decided not to join his friends in a bank robbery which 
successfully netted a million dollars for each participant.6 As this example 
shows, it is possible to feel regret and guilt for both acts and failures to act; 
at the same time, regret and guilt diffGr since one can regret not having done 
something immoral but one does not feel guilty for that. 
There are other differences between guilt and regret. Once again, as 
with remorse and regret, regret is the broader concept. One of the primary 
ways in which regret subsumes guilt is in terms of agency. I t  is appropriate 
to speak of regret both with reference to one’s own free and voluntary acts 
(or omissions) and also with reference to acts over which one had no 
personal control. In contrast, guilt is limited to events over which one had 
some measure of personal responsiblity or control (Finagrette, 1967; H. D. 
Lewis, 1947; Roseman, 1979, 1982). Thus, individuals might regret a 
judicial decision limiting the civil rights of a minority group but feel no guilt 
over it because it was outside the aegis of their personal control. 
Notwithstanding this distinction, there is a sense in which guilt has 
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been construed as a response not only to one’s own offenses but also the 
offenses of similar others. The notion of collective guilt (Jaspers, 1947) has 
been advanced as a form of co-responsibility incurred by all Germans for 
the Holocaust offenses committed by some Germans, or more broadly as 
the co-responsibility of all members of a group for the acts of some 
members. Similarly, one can imagine collective regret whereby the 
members of a group share misgivings, dissatisfaction, or distress of mind 
over the acts of other members of their group. For example, male feminists 
might experience collective regret over the efforts of some men to 
undermine the implementation of affirmative action. 
To consider the issue of personal agency and responsibility for offenses 
is to enter the domains of morality and legality. And herein lies a second 
way in which regret subsumes guilt. Philosophers have typically defined 
guilt as a distinctively moral emotion (Fingarette, 1967; Harvey, 1947; D. 
H. Jones, 1966; H. D. Lewis, 1947); and psychologists (Wicker, Payne, and 
Morgan, 1983) have provided empirical evidence in support of this 
assertion. Wicker et al. (1983) had respondents rate their own guilt 
experiences on a number of theory-based dimensions, among which was 
moral nature of the offense. In their ratings these respondents did express 
a direct connection between guilt and moral failings. Guilt is limited to 
circumstances involving an offense against a legal and/or moral 
precept-or involving something considered by the agent as constituting a 
legal or moral transgression. Regret, on the other hand, applies more 
broadly to moral and legal domains as well as to domains without moral or 
legal implications. 
The conclusion that regret subsumes guilt with respect to the moral 
nature of the offense is not shared by all scholars. In Roseman’s (1979) 
theory of emotion, regret and guilt are viewed as “opposite” emotions 
because they are thought to differ on just this feature. According to 
Roseman (1979, p. 10, Footnote lo), only guilt and not regret involves 
moral blame: “The difference between Regret and Guilt is like the 
difference between making a mistake and committing a sin or  rime."^ 
Solomon (1938) concurs with this distinctions, describing guilt as 
entailing “extreme” blame and regret as entailing no blame because it 
concerns circumstances beyond one’s control. 
Despite the prima facie plausibility of this distinction, I believe it is at 
variance with psychologica! experience, in which one can and does regret 
not only one’s mistakes but also one’s sins and crimes. Indeed, the 
categories are not so easy to distinguish. Was Lady Macbeth guilty but not 
regretful about the murder of Duncan? Was the Rat Man guilty but not 
regretful? I think not. I think it is more accurate to describe Lady Macbeth 
and Freud’s patient as at once guilty and regretful than to limit the 
experience to one or the other emotion. In general, it seems impossible to 
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imagine an instance of guilt without regret, but quite possible to imagine 
an instance of regret without guilt. 
Thus, regret is once again the broader concept. Regret cannot be limited 
to instances in which there is legal, moral, or psychological culpability but 
includes instances of legally, morally, and subjectively innocuous acts. 
Furthermore, unlike guilt, regret cannot be limited to one's own free and 
voluntary acts and failures to act but also includes the acts and omissions 
of others as well as deeds over which one had no control. 
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS 
This consideration of regret and related concepts suggests that regret is a 
superordinate concept that subsumes certain defining features of remorse 
and guilt, but that regret can also be distinguished from remorse and 
regret by certain clear boundaries. In addition, regret is phenomenally 
associated with undoing. These conclusions conform to the results of 
recent research which indicates ( I )  that emotions tend to occur in positive 
or negative clusters rather than in isolation and/or (2) that people are poor 
at  discriminating among their own related emotions (H. B. Lewis, 1971; 
Polivy, 1981). If the emotions of anger, depression, and anxiety typically 
occur together (or are reported as occurring together) (Polivy, 1983) and if 
the emotions of shame and guilt often occur together (or are so reported) 
(H. B. Lewis, 1g71), then it should come as little surprise that regret, 
remorse, and guilt might covary. 
In sum, an extended working definition of regret can be stated this way: 
regret is a more or less painful cognitive/affective state of feeling sorry for 
losses, transgressions, shortcoming, or mistakes. The regretted matters 
may have been sins of commission as well as sins of omission; they may 
range from the entirely voluntary to the accidental; they may have been 
actually executed deeds or entirely mental ones; they may have been 
committed by oneself or by another person or group; they may be moral or 
legal transgressions or morally and legally neutral; and the regretted 
matters may have occurred in the past, the present, or the future. 
Among the major goals of conceptual and theoretical analysis is the 
pragmatic one of facilitating the testing of claims about the phenomenon 
in question. The present analysis contributes to this goal in a number of 
ways. 
First, it suggests that the business of conceptual analysis itself could 
benefit from further empirical work. Insofar as it pinpoints areas of 
controversy or disagreement among scholars, the present analysis encour- 
ages others to investigate definitional disagreement empirically-for 
example, to discover whether most people include or exclude from their 
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concept of regret those losses, acts, or events which were not under their 
personal control. I t  should be possible, by means of prototype analysis 
(e.g., Cantor and Mischel, 1977; Rosch and Mervis, 1975) or other sorts of 
empirical investigation, to clarify further the boundaries separating regret 
from similar concepts and to clarify which are the most typical elements 
and objects of regret. 
Second, this analysis suggests that future theory and research need to 
consider both the cognitive and the affective nature of regret and the 
possible implications of these for human thought, feeling, and action. It 
remains to flesh out in detail the psychology of regret-the cognitive, 
emotional, and situational regularities underlying the experience. 
This analysis also suggests questions concerning the internal and 
external antecedents of regret. Can there be said to exist regretful 
personalities (e.g., Freud’s obsessive ruminators) who exhibit a stable and 
cross-situational propensity to regret? Or is regret more often an effect of 
adverse circumstances, as implied in the work of Kahneman and Tversky? 
Markus’s (1982; Markus and Nurius 1986) research on possible selves 
points up the importance of studying self-relevant regret-e.g., the 
manner in which people incorporate negative past selves (regrettable 
aspects of the self) into their overall self-concept. For example, this 
research suggests alternative explanatory accounts of the link between 
thought and a negative affect like regret. I t  may be that people who 
remember or imagine a large number of bad selves suffer greater regret 
than those whose store of negative possible selves is smaller. Regret then 
may depend not only on the number of actual sins one has committed, but 
also simply on how imaginative one is. An alternative view of the 
relationship between negative affect and negative past selves is that 
negative affect recruits regretted past selves. I t  may be only when someone 
is unhappy with the present state of affairs that he or she is likely to call up 
a large number of negative past selves as part of his or her self-concept. 
Another question of theoretical interest is how self-relevant regret differs 
from ather-relevant regret. 
Finally, this analysis raises questions about the functions of regret. Is 
regret a wholly futile activity, as Lady Macbeth argued to her husband 
following the murder: “Things without all remedy should be without 
regard; what’s done is done”? Although on the face of it, regret would 
seem to be an  almost un-American experience in its perverse failure of 
optimism, is it necessarily a negative force for personal adjustment? Are 
those who consciously regret thereby debilitated? Or are there potentially 
salutary cognitive, emotional, or behavioral sequelae to regret? As I 
indicated earlier, there are reasons to believe that regret is neither useless 
or necessarily malignant, but that there are important purposes (e.g., 
instruction, emotional governance, reparation, remembrance) to be served 
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by regret, purposes awaiting discovery and elaboration by future investig- 
ation. 
It is hoped that the present conceptual and theoretical analysis will 
contribute further to the investigation of regret. For regret is a most 
distinctly psychological phenomenon, bridging as it does the cognitive and 
the emotional, the past and the present, the actual and the mental. Insofar 
as “time is seen to be continuous and irreversible; choices once made are 
made forever; a second chance cannot be the same as the first; life is 
progression toward death without rebirth” (Schafer, 1976, p. 36), regret is 
undoubtedly the inevitable, universal human experience Baldwin thought it 
to be-and for this reason alone, a singularly consequential object of 
study. 
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NOTES 
’ All lexicographic definitions used in this article are taken from Webster’s Unabridged 
Third New International Dictionary. 
Leventhal’s model of emotion is a perceptual-motor model in which cognitive processing is 
a frequent but not necessary feature. For example, according to Leventhal, infants are 
capable of cognitively unelaborated emotional responses to perceptual stimuli. This type of 
emotional activity is an innate, automatic response to the activation of an expressive-motor 
system. This theory stands in clear opposition to the cognition-arousal theories of emotion 
(e.g., Schachter & Singer, 1962; Schachter, 1964). 
3The fact that regret is a phenomenon requiring not only consciousness but also 
self-consciousness further supports the assumption that regret is not experienced by animals 
or human infants. 
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4 This example was pointed out to me by Sidney Gendin. 
5 This explanation was suggested to me by Jean D. Manis. 
’ The face validity of the respective analogies between regredmistakes and guilt/sins 
may stem from a common association between guilt and absolution, an association which is 
not characteristic of regret. Thus, like repentance and remorse, guilt seems to entail the 
possibility of forgiveness, while regret may or may not. 
Sidney Gendin pointed out this example to me. 
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